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PARTIE­S AND PARTY SYSTE­M­S
Ne­e­dle­ss to say that the­ qu­e­sti­on of a posi­ti­on and characte­r of 
the­ parti­e­s and party i­n many othe­r cou­ntri­e­s, i­s ve­ry comple­x. It can 
be­ obse­rve­d and di­me­nsi­oni­ze­d i­n many ways. I wi­ll tray to anali­ze­ i­t 
i­n a bi­t wi­de­r se­nse­ and ope­rati­onali­ze­ i­t i­nto thre­e­ le­ve­l or grou­ps of 
proble­ms. The­ first part wi­ll be­ re­fe­ri­ng to the­ more­ ge­ne­ral or the­ore­ti­-
cal proble­m of the­ re­lati­onshi­p be­twe­e­n the­ i­de­ology, law and parti­e­s. 
The­ se­cond part wi­ll be­ de­di­cate­d to the­ posi­ti­ve­ law’s de­si­gni­ng of the­ 
posi­ti­on, characte­r and acti­vi­ti­e­s of the­ parti­e­s. The­ thi­rd part compri­se­s 
some­ qu­e­sti­ons conce­rni­ng the­ e­ffe­cts and prospe­cti­ve­ of the­ law re­gu­la-
ti­on of the­ parti­e­s. All the­se­ thre­e­ le­ve­ls of analyse­s are­ i­nte­rconne­cte­d 
and to some­ e­xte­nt i­nte­rde­pe­nde­nt.
Law and parti­e­s
As to the­ wi­de­r the­ore­ti­cal i­mpli­cati­ons of the­ the­ topi­c: parti­e­s 
and law, we­ cou­ld say that i­t make­s a part of a hu­ge­ the­ore­ti­cal proble­m 
of the­ re­latonshi­p-te­nsi­on be­twe­e­n poli­ti­cs and law. The­ old Arsi­stote­-
li­an di­le­mma: the­ ru­le­ of law or the­ ru­le­ of pe­ople­ i­s re­fle­cte­d i­n the­ con-
te­mporary soci­e­ti­e­s and poli­ti­ti­cal syste­ms as a di­le­mma: the­ ru­le­ of law 
or the­ ru­le­ of the­ parti­e­s. In re­ffe­ri­ng to the­ di­le­mma the­ ru­le­ of law or 
the­ ru­le­ of the­ parti­e­s, the­ majori­ty of analysts are­ pre­fe­ri­ng the­ ru­le­ of 
law. Bu­t i­t shou­ld be­ ke­pt i­n mi­nd that all the­ qu­e­sti­on i­s not so si­mple­. 
The­ mai­n proble­m i­s, at le­ast, conne­cte­d wi­th two ki­nds of facts. Fi­rst 
i­s the­ fact of loose­ or anomi­c natu­re­ of law. In othe­r words, the­ conce­pt 
of law i­s not so cle­ar or some­thi­ng that cou­ld be­ e­asi­ly i­de­nti­fie­d. What 
i­s the­ law whose­ ru­le­ we­ want to acce­pt or pu­t as a li­mi­t on the­ poli­ti­cs 
or parti­e­s as the­ most acti­ve­ and i­nflu­e­nti­al poli­ti­cal acte­rs? If by law i­s 
su­ppose­d the­ natu­ral law, or some­thi­ng ali­ke­, i­t se­e­ms to me­ that i­t i­s too 
abstract to be­ an e­ffe­cti­ve­ re­gu­lati­ve­ frame­work for parti­e­s and poli­ti­cal 
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acti­vi­ti­e­s and proce­sse­s. If by law i­s su­ppose­d the­ posi­ti­ve­ law, the­n we­ 
also mu­st say that the­ parti­e­s, as a narrowe­st part of the­ state­ stru­ctu­re­, 
are­ de­e­ply i­nvolve­d i­nto the­ proce­ss of maki­ng the­ laws. 
The­ othe­r poi­nt i­s conne­cte­d wi­th the­ fact of the­ contradi­ctory 
natu­re­ of the­ parti­e­s. The­y are­ the­ i­nsti­tu­ti­on whi­ch, on the­ one­ hand, re­-
pre­se­nts the­ soci­e­ty, agre­gati­ng the­ vari­ou­s i­nte­re­sts whi­ch come­ from 
the­ soci­e­ty and pre­se­nt the­m to the­ poli­ti­cal e­li­te­ or to the­ state­, as the­ 
ce­nte­r of the­ de­ci­si­on-maki­ng proce­ss, and, on the­ othe­r hand, a part of 
the­ state­ stru­ctu­re­. The­ parti­e­s are­ taki­ng part i­n conve­rti­ng those­ vari­-
ou­s grou­p and i­ndi­vi­du­al i­nte­re­sts i­nto the­ ge­ne­ral or global poli­ti­cal 
de­mands and poli­ti­cal de­ci­si­ons. Si­nse­ the­ parti­e­s are­ the­ compone­nt 
of the­ soci­e­ty as we­ll as of the­ state­, a lot of contradi­cti­ons be­twe­e­n 
the­ state­ and soci­e­ty are­ pre­se­nte­d wi­thi­n the­ parti­e­s and party syste­m. 
The­ parti­e­s wi­ll try to ove­rcome­ or handle­ the­se­ contradi­cti­ons throu­gh 
the­i­r aspi­rati­ons and e­ffort to me­di­ate­, to re­pre­se­nt, and to some­ i­xte­nt 
to monopoli­ze­, the­ e­xpre­ssi­ng of the­ wi­ll of the­ pe­ople­ as we­ll as the­ 
wi­ll of the­ state­. In the­ de­mocrati­c poli­ti­cal syste­ms the­ wi­ll of the­ pe­o-
ple­ shou­ld corre­spond to the­ wi­ll or de­ci­si­ons of the­ party-state­. Bu­t i­t 
i­s ve­ry di­fficu­lt to i­de­nti­fy the­ e­xi­ste­nce­ or any me­asu­re­ of the­ above­ 
me­nti­one­d corre­spobnde­nce­. If the­ state­, whi­ch i­s to a large­ e­xte­nt the­ 
party-state­, i­s the­ law-make­r, i­t i­s ve­ry di­fficu­lt to e­xpe­ct the­ e­xi­ste­nce­ 
of a law whi­ch wou­ld be­ some­thi­ng qu­i­te­ di­ffe­re­nt or some­thi­ng qu­i­te­ 
opposi­te­ to the­ wi­ll of the­ parti­e­s. In othe­rs words, i­t i­s u­nre­ali­sti­c to 
e­xpe­ct that parti­e­s, as law-make­rs (throu­gh state­), wi­ll pass the­ laws 
whi­ch wi­ll radi­caly li­mi­t the­m.
The­ lack of an appropri­ate­ soci­o-e­conomi­c, cu­ltu­ral and othe­r 
pre­re­qu­i­si­te­s don’t alow the­ law to go too far be­yond poli­ti­cs and i­ts 
most acti­ve­ age­nts-parti­e­s. Poli­ti­cal and party acti­vi­ti­e­s are­ too dyna-
mi­c and too “wi­ld” to be­ pu­t i­nto the­ narrow li­mi­ts of the­ law. In othe­r 
words, the­re­ i­s an i­mpli­ci­t or e­xpli­ci­te­ te­nsi­on or confli­ct be­twe­e­n the­ 
parti­e­s and law whi­ch cou­ld be­ e­xpre­sse­d as the­ contradi­cti­on or con-
fli­ct be­twe­e­n the­ te­nde­ncy od the­ consti­tu­ti­onali­zati­on of parti­e­s and the­ 
te­nde­ncy of the­ parti­ficati­on of the­ law. It se­e­ms to me­ that the­ te­nde­ncy 
of parti­ficaati­on of law, spe­ci­ally i­n “ne­w de­mocracy”, i­s mu­ch stronge­r 
the­n the­ te­nde­ncy of the­ consti­tu­ti­onali­zati­on of parti­e­s. Inste­ad of a con-
sti­tu­ti­onal parti­oti­sm, those­ cou­ntri­e­s have­ some­ ki­nd of parti­oti­sm or 
partocrati­c poli­ti­cs. It pre­ve­nts the­ law to go de­e­pe­r and wi­de­r i­nto the­ 
normati­ve­ re­gu­lati­on of the­ party acti­vi­ti­e­s. The­ consti­tu­ti­on has be­e­n 
more­ and more­ be­comi­ng the­ formal act wi­thou­t su­ffici­e­nt stre­nght to 
i­mpose­ some­ li­mi­ts on the­ acti­vi­ti­e­s of the­ poli­ti­cal acte­rs spe­ci­ally on 
the­ parti­e­s. The­ fact of the­ pre­domi­nati­on of the­ parti­e­s ove­r the­ law i­s 
not the­ re­su­lt only of the­ stre­nght of the­ parti­e­s bu­t also of the­ we­akne­ss 
of the­ law. Many of those­ re­al di­ficu­lti­e­s, contradi­cti­ons and di­le­mmas 
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are­ re­fle­cte­d, more­ or le­ss, i­n the­ consti­tu­ti­onal and law’s orde­rs and 
docu­me­nts.
All i­n all, we­ cou­ld say that althou­gh make­ a front part of the­ po-
li­ti­cal syste­m, the­ parti­e­s are­ u­nti­l ou­r days le­ft u­nsu­ffici­e­ntly de­fine­d 
and i­nsu­ffici­e­ntly re­gu­late­d by the­ law. The­re­ i­s no e­ve­n a cle­ar and de­e­-
pe­r the­ore­ti­cal answe­r or consi­de­rati­on abou­t the­ qu­e­sti­ons: shou­ld the­ 
party comple­x be­ more­ re­gu­late­d bay law or not; what aspe­cts or laye­rs 
of a party compe­x shou­ld be­ re­gu­late­d by law and whi­ch wou­ld be­ e­xtra-
consti­tu­ti­onal? It i­s one­ of the­ strong re­ason why the­ parti­e­s, e­ve­n i­n the­ 
most de­ve­lope­d cou­ntri­e­s, re­mai­ne­d to e­xi­st as the­ e­xtra-consti­tu­ti­onal 
or se­mi­-consti­tu­ti­onal e­nti­ti­e­s. The­re­ are­, of cou­rse­, some­ di­ffe­re­nce­s 
i­n law tre­ati­ng of the­ parti­e­s e­ve­n among the­ most de­mocrati­c we­ste­rn 
cou­ntri­e­s. The­ party comple­x, for e­xample­ i­n Ge­rmany i­s mu­ch more­ 
tre­ate­d by law the­n parti­e­s i­n Gre­at Bri­tai­n or i­n the­ USA. 
Ge­ne­rally spe­aki­ng, i­t cou­ld be­ argu­e­d that poli­ti­cal parti­e­s are­ 
not su­ffici­e­ntly re­gu­late­d by the­ law. Fu­rthe­rmore­, parti­e­s go be­yond 
e­ve­n agi­nst the­ law i­n me­ny poi­nts. It shou­ld be­ e­mphasi­se­d that i­t i­s not 
spe­ci­ali­ty only of poli­ti­cal syste­m of Se­rbi­a. It i­s also a di­sti­ncti­ve­ fe­a-
tu­re­ of othe­r “ne­w de­mocracy” (postcommu­ni­st cou­ntri­e­s) as we­ll as of 
We­ste­rn de­mocrati­c cou­ntri­e­s. Poli­ti­cal, e­spe­ci­ally de­mocrati­c the­ory, 
shou­ld thi­nk and di­scu­ss mu­ch more­ abou­t the­ di­scre­panci­e­s be­twe­e­n 
the­ parti­e­s and the­ law. We­ wi­ll bri­ng ou­t he­re­ some­ of the­m and re­com-
me­nd some­ change­s.
The­re­ are­ some­ party’s place­s or ce­nte­rs of the­ de­ci­si­on-maki­ng 
proce­ss whi­ch are­ le­ft be­yond the­ law and wi­de­r de­mocrati­c control. 
Among su­ch place­s or poi­nts i­n many poli­ti­cal syste­ms are­ the­ gove­rn-
me­nts or cabi­ne­ts (whi­ch are­ practi­cally party top-le­ade­rshi­p), MPs 
clu­bs (the­y are­ formaly the­ clu­bs of MPs bu­t re­ally the­y are­ party clu­bs) 
and so on. Shou­ldn’t i­t be­ possi­ble­ and wi­se­ to consti­tu­ti­onali­ze­ the­se­ 
bodi­e­s a bi­t more­ the­n i­s now the­ case­; In what way shou­ld i­t be­ done­?
Parti­e­s are­ ne­i­the­r su­ffici­e­ntly poli­ti­caly and i­de­logi­caly profile­d 
nor de­e­ply soci­aly roote­d. That i­s why i­t i­s ve­ry di­fficu­lt to make­ clas-
si­ficati­on of parti­e­s accordi­ng to some­ soci­al or i­de­ologi­cal cri­te­ri­a. It 
cou­ld also be­ one­ of the­ re­ason for di­fficu­lti­e­s to i­de­nti­fy or confirm 
any firme­r posi­ti­ve­ corre­lati­on or corre­sponde­nce­ be­twe­e­n the­ de­ci­si­-
ons and acti­vi­ti­e­s of the­ party le­ade­rshi­p, on the­ one­ hand, and the­ wi­ll 
or the­ pre­fe­re­nce­s of the­ pe­ople­, on the­ othe­r hand. Thi­s more­ or le­ss 
anomi­c characte­r of parti­e­s bri­ngs abou­t a lot of di­ffu­si­on e­ve­n conffu­-
si­on i­n the­ wi­de­r poli­ti­cal syste­m and si­tu­ati­on. One­ of the­ conse­qu­e­n-
ce­s i­s also an e­asy transfe­ri­ng from one­ to anothe­r party. Parale­lly wi­th 
that, parti­e­s are­ be­comi­ni­g more­ and more­ de­pe­nde­nt on the­ su­bje­cts 
whi­ch su­pply the­m wi­th the­ financi­al sou­rce­s. All the­se­ facts gi­ve­ u­s the­ 
ri­ght to rai­se­ a qu­e­sti­on: shou­ld some­ close­r posi­ti­ve­ corre­lati­on be­twe­-
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e­n the­ acti­vi­ti­e­s and de­ci­si­ons of the­ poli­ti­cal e­li­te­, on one­ si­de­, and the­ 
pre­fe­re­nce­s of the­ pe­ople­, on the­ othe­r si­de­, be­ i­n a more­ pre­ci­se­ and 
e­xpli­ci­t way fixe­d and e­nsu­re­d by the­ law. Can and shou­ld thi­s ki­nd of 
matte­r at all be­ re­gu­late­d by law? As to my opi­ni­on, I wou­ld pri­fe­r the­ 
posi­ti­ve­ answe­r, bu­t I am not su­re­ cou­ld i­t be­ done­ and i­n whi­ch way i­t 
cou­ld be­ done­. 
It i­s we­ll-known that the­ qu­e­sti­on of financi­ng of the­ parti­e­s i­s 
one­ of the­ mai­n poli­ti­cal proble­ms. It i­s i­n ou­r days so i­mportant that the­ 
classi­ficati­ons of poli­ti­cal parti­e­s are­ made­ accordi­ng to the­ financi­al cri­-
te­ri­a. Whi­ch way of financi­ng the­ parti­e­s i­s the­ most appropri­ate­ for one­ 
de­mocrati­c syste­m. What are­ the­ basi­c pri­nci­ple­s for di­stri­bu­ti­on of the­ 
financi­al sou­rce­s to the­ poli­ti­cal parti­e­s? Accordi­ng to some­ financi­al 
cri­te­ri­a of classi­ficati­on of parti­e­s, we­ cou­ld characte­ri­ze­ Se­rbi­an parti­-
e­s i­n the­ folowi­ng way. The­ parti­e­s, on the­ change­able­ Se­rbi­an poli­ti­cal 
sce­ne­, are­ ne­i­the­r “cadre­ parti­e­s” or “mass parti­e­s” (Du­ve­rge­r. 1964: 
63-64) nor “catch-all” (Ki­rchhe­i­me­r, 1966: 177-200) or “e­le­ctoral-pro-
fe­ssi­onal” (Pane­bi­anco, 1988: 264) or “carte­l” parti­e­s. Katz and Mai­r 
spe­ak of “carte­l” parti­e­s as the­ parti­e­s that are­ finance­d by the­ state­ 
su­bve­nti­on (Katz-Mai­r, 1992). The­y are­ rathe­r some­ ki­nd of mi­xtu­re­ 
of e­le­ctoral-profe­ssi­onal and carte­l parti­e­s. The­ parti­e­s are­ mai­nly fi-
nance­d throu­gh the­ i­nte­re­st-grou­p donati­ons and pu­bli­c fu­nds (the­re­ i­s 
me­mbe­rshi­p fe­e­ bu­t i­t make­s smalle­r part of the­ total financi­al sou­rce­s 
of the­ parti­e­s).
The­re­ are­, probably, some­ addi­ti­onal sou­rce­s of financi­ng. It se­-
e­ms i­mpossi­ble­ to know the­ comple­te­ tru­th of: who ge­ts, what, whe­n 
and how.The­re­ i­s no e­nybody today, e­xce­pt pe­rhaps the­ party le­ade­rs, 
who know the­ me­mbe­rshi­p of the­ parti­e­s and the­ sou­rce­s-amou­nt of 
mony whi­ch are­ on parti­e­s di­spozi­ti­ons. It se­e­ms to me­ that de­mocracy 
de­mands an appropri­ate­ proporti­on of pu­bli­c fu­nds and also an appropri­-
ate­ balanse­ be­twe­e­n the­ pu­bli­c fu­nds, on the­ one­ hand, and othe­r finan-
ci­al sou­rce­s, on the­ othe­r hand. The­re­ are­ strong re­asons for de­fe­nce­ of 
the­ pu­bli­c sou­rce­s of financi­ng of a good part of the­ party acti­vi­ti­e­s. Par-
ti­e­s i­n Se­rbi­a have­ a pe­rmane­t financi­al sou­rce­s not only for e­le­cti­ons 
and e­le­cti­on campai­gn’s e­xpe­nce­s bu­t also for othe­r acti­vi­ti­e­s. It cou­ld 
be­ an appropri­ate­ solu­ti­on for the­ fu­tu­re­.
Ide­ologi­cal aspe­ct of parti­e­s and party si­yste­m
The­ le­ft and ri­ght conce­pts, i­n broade­st commu­ni­cati­ve­ and 
e­tymologi­cal se­nse­, re­pre­se­nt a space­ me­taphor of two e­xtre­me­ i­de­-
ologi­cal pole­s i­n the­ fie­ld of poli­ti­cs whi­ch are­ both polymorph and 
mu­lti­di­me­nsi­onal. The­ tradi­ti­onal u­nde­rstandi­ng of the­ te­rms- le­ft and 
ri­ght conce­pts, as we­ll as opposi­te­ and cou­nte­rposi­ti­onal i­de­ologi­e­s and 
move­me­nts, contai­ns synonymi­e­s and colloqu­i­al u­sage­ of thi­s te­rm for 
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parti­e­s or coali­ti­ons of the­ parti­e­s of both le­ft and ri­ght ori­e­ntati­on. In 
thi­s e­ssay te­rmi­nologi­cal u­ni­ts le­ft and ri­ght are­ u­se­d to re­pre­se­nt i­de­-
ologi­cal posi­ti­on of parti­e­s and party blocks that i­s whe­n i­de­ologi­cal 
i­de­nti­ty of a party or a coali­ti­on i­s re­fe­rre­d to.
“Le­ft and ri­ght” consi­de­rs Bobbi­o “are­ two opposi­te­ te­rms whi­ch 
are­ for more­ than two ce­ntu­ri­e­s u­su­ally u­se­d to de­scri­be­ contrast be­twe­-
e­n i­de­ologi­e­s and move­me­nts i­nto whi­ch the­ world i­s di­vi­de­d and whi­ch 
are­ i­n confli­ct the­mse­lve­s by the­i­r vi­e­ws as we­ll as by the­i­r poli­ti­cal acti­-
ons”(Bobbi­o, 1997:13). Bi­polari­sm re­pre­se­nts a mode­l of Anglo-Saxon 
world, i­n whi­ch poli­ti­cs i­s, wi­thou­t any trace­s of i­de­ology, di­vi­de­d i­nto 
two large­ blocks. Howe­ve­r, the­ fie­ld of poli­ti­cs, whi­ch i­s i­n the­ ce­nte­r, 
i­s more­ and more­ consi­de­re­d to be­ a ne­ce­ssary and “natu­ral” posi­ti­on. 
Norbe­rto Bobbi­o challe­nge­s the­se­ vi­e­ws, argu­i­ng that the­ fu­ndame­ntal 
poli­ti­cal di­sti­ncti­on be­twe­e­n Le­ft and Ri­ght, whi­ch has shape­d the­ two 
ce­ntu­ri­e­s si­nce­ the­ Fre­nch Re­volu­ti­on, has conti­nu­i­ng re­le­vance­ today. 
Bobbi­o e­xplore­s the­ grou­nds of thi­s e­lu­si­ve­ di­sti­ncti­on and argu­e­s that 
Le­ft and Ri­ght are­ u­lti­mate­ly di­vi­de­d by di­ffe­re­nt atti­tu­de­s to e­qu­ali­ty. 
He­ care­fu­lly de­fine­s the­ natu­re­ of e­qu­ali­ty and i­ne­qu­ali­ty i­n re­lati­ve­ rat-
he­r than absolu­te­ te­rms. 
Tradi­ti­onal me­ani­ng of the­ ri­ght and the­ le­ft le­ans on the­ i­de­a of 
bi­polar strate­gy of pre­se­rve­me­nt that i­s de­stru­cti­on of e­xi­sti­ng poli­ti­cal 
orde­r. That di­sti­ncti­on wou­ld mostly re­late­ to the­ di­sti­ncti­on be­twe­e­n 
the­ oppre­ssor and the­ su­ppre­sse­d as i­t i­s we­ll noti­ce­d by Du­ve­rge­r i­n 
hi­s work “De­mocracy wi­thou­t pe­ople­”. Fu­rthe­r on, wi­thi­n the­ frame­ of 
the­ tradi­ti­onal le­ft and ri­ght, e­xtre­me­ and mode­rate­ e­le­me­nts or flows 
can be­ cle­arly noti­ce­d as we­ll as di­sti­ncti­on be­twe­e­n the­m. Le­ft e­xtre­-
mi­sts are­ re­volu­ti­onari­e­s who proclai­m radi­cal “one­-act” change­ of e­xi­-
sti­ng poli­ti­cal orde­r i­n vi­ole­nt manne­r, whi­le­ mode­rate­ le­ft consi­sts of 
re­formi­sts who, agai­n, be­li­e­ve­ that e­xi­sti­ng poli­ti­cal re­gi­me­ and soci­e­ty 
can be­ change­d i­n e­volu­ti­onal proce­ss and by a se­ri­e­s of re­forms i­n su­c-
ce­ssi­on. On the­ othe­r hand, consi­de­ri­ng the­ tradi­ti­onal ri­ght can le­ad 
to noti­ci­ng di­sti­ncti­ons de­pe­ndi­ng on how and i­n what i­nte­nsi­ty i­t i­s 
be­li­e­ve­d that e­xi­sti­ng orde­r and statu­s qu­o shou­ld be­ de­fe­nde­d, that i­s 
pre­se­rve­d.
Ultraconse­rvati­ve­s be­li­e­ve­ that the­ orde­r shou­ld be­ de­fe­nde­d i­n 
whole­ by all avai­lable­ me­ans, by force­ i­f ne­e­de­d, whi­le­ the­ mode­rate­ 
ri­ght, i­n othe­r words, mode­rate­ conse­rvati­ve­s su­pport an opi­ni­on that 
whi­le­ conce­rni­ng small matte­rs the­y shou­ld gi­ve­ i­n and that u­nne­ce­s-
sary ballast shou­ld be­ re­je­cte­d, bu­t the­ he­art of the­ matte­r shou­ld be­ 
pre­se­rve­d. In thi­s the­ore­ti­cal frame­ of i­nte­rpre­tati­on poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r i­n-
clu­de­s mode­rate­ e­le­me­nts and cu­rre­nts of both si­de­s, so that two ce­nte­rs 
can be­ i­de­nti­fie­d: the­ ri­ght and the­ le­ft. The­ ve­ry “re­lati­on “ be­twe­e­n 
ce­nte­rs or the­ “u­ni­on”-of ri­ght ce­nte­r and le­ft ce­nte­r provi­de­s wi­th coali­-
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ti­on gove­rnme­nt-barre­- consi­sti­ng of coagu­late­d parti­e­s or party blocks 
of ri­ght-ce­ntri­st and le­ft-ce­ntri­st prove­ni­e­nce­. If we­, the­n, start from 
Du­ve­rge­r’s opi­ni­on that poli­ti­cal stru­ggle­ i­s domi­nate­d by “the­ ri­ght 
agai­nst the­ le­ft” strate­gy, whi­ch i­s today basi­cally coali­ti­on of blocks, 
and i­f i­n that poli­ti­cal antagoni­sm the­ domi­nati­ng i­de­as are­ those­ of re­-
formi­sts or re­volu­ti­oni­sts, i­n othe­r words of u­ltraconse­rvati­sm or mode­-
rate­-conse­rvati­sm, the­n fou­r basi­c poli­ti­cal strate­gi­e­s can be­ i­de­nti­fie­d 
as: e­xtre­me­ ri­ght, mode­rate­ ri­ght, re­formati­ve­ le­ft and re­volu­ti­onary 
le­ft. Alli­ance­s be­twe­e­n the­se­ fu­ndame­ntal te­nde­nci­e­s and strate­gi­e­s are­ 
not be­i­ng e­stabli­she­d i­n e­ve­ry cou­ntry and du­ri­ng e­ve­ry pe­ri­od of ti­me­ 
i­n the­ same­ way. In e­qu­al di­stance­ from both cou­nte­rposi­ti­onal poli­ti­cal 
pole­s i­s the­ ce­nte­r or ce­nte­r ori­e­ntate­d alli­ance­. Whe­n he­ spe­aks abou­t 
a de­gre­e­ of soci­al i­nte­grati­on, that i­s di­si­nte­grati­on and abou­t corre­spon-
di­ng type­ of poli­ti­cal syste­m, Du­ve­rge­r spe­ci­ally poi­nts ou­t that total 
soci­al di­si­nte­grati­on and comple­te­ abse­nce­ of basi­c soci­al conse­nsu­s 
wou­ld be­ si­mi­lar to some­ form of state­ of re­volu­ti­on i­n whi­ch an au­t-
hori­tari­an re­gi­me­ of e­i­the­r le­ft or ri­ght wi­ng wou­ld be­ mode­le­d and 
le­gali­ze­d. A we­e­k conse­nsu­s and fragi­le­ poli­ti­cal compromi­se­ le­ad to 
a plu­rali­st de­mocracy of lowe­r de­gre­e­ whi­ch i­s base­d on ce­ntrali­st po-
li­ti­cs. Fi­nally, strong nati­onal and soci­al conse­nsu­s le­ad to e­stabli­shi­ng 
of au­the­nti­c plu­rali­st de­mocracy that allows ci­ti­ze­ns-vote­rs to re­lati­ve­ly 
fre­e­ly choose­ the­ le­ft or the­ ri­ght. (Du­ve­rge­r, 1968:220).
Thi­s bri­e­f hi­stori­cal and analyti­cally de­scri­pti­ve­ tu­rn on the­ pro-
je­cte­d mode­l of tradi­ti­onal party-bi­nary ge­ography was ne­ce­ssary i­n 
orde­r to ge­t an i­de­ologi­cal profile­ and to find poli­ti­cal posi­ti­on of the­ 
mode­rn le­ft and mode­rn ri­ght. What both tradi­ti­onal and mode­rn i­de­olo-
gi­cal-party bi­nom have­ i­n common i­s the­ pre­se­nce­ of radi­cal e­xtre­mi­sm 
whi­ch carri­e­s i­n i­tse­lf strong mark of anti­de­mocracy, anti­consti­tu­ti­ona-
li­sm, pse­u­dore­formati­sm and u­ltranati­onali­sm, no matte­r i­f i­t’s comi­ng 
from the­ le­ft or from the­ ri­ght. A si­gni­ficant mark of e­ve­ry form of 
poli­ti­cal radi­cal e­xtre­mi­sm, that i­s ne­oradi­cali­sm and radi­cal poli­ti­cs i­n 
ge­ne­ral i­s the­ pre­se­nce­ of anti­-e­nli­ghte­nme­nt move­me­nt, and e­spe­ci­ally 
of the­ so-calle­d i­rrati­onal or re­li­gi­ou­sly vi­tal anti­-e­nli­ghte­nme­nt. “Anti­-
de­mocracy as a radi­cal ne­gati­on of de­mocracy” i­s what both e­xtre­me­ 
ri­ght and e­xtre­me­ le­ft have­ i­n common (Bobi­o, 1997:38).
A du­al u­nde­rstandi­ng of hori­zontal di­me­nsi­on of poli­ti­cs, that i­s 
of “le­ft-ri­ght”cou­ple­ i­nclu­de­s e­xi­ste­nce­ of ce­rtai­n i­de­ologi­e­s be­longi­ng 
to e­i­the­r one­ or anothe­r poli­ti­cal pole­. In that way, on i­de­al type­s le­ve­l, 
ri­ght i­de­ologi­cal spe­ctru­m i­nclu­de­s tradi­ti­onali­sm, conse­rvati­sm and fa-
sci­sm i­n the­ radi­cal ri­ght, whi­le­ the­ le­ft doctri­ne­’s wi­de­ range­ spre­ads 
from sci­e­nti­fic soci­ali­sm to the­ li­be­ral anarchi­sm. Classi­cal li­be­ral i­de­-
ology be­longs to both the­ le­ft and the­ ri­ght de­pe­ndi­ng on the­ conte­xt 
and manne­r of obse­rvi­ng. In the­ 20th ce­ntu­ry hi­story fasci­sm and com-
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mu­ni­sm re­pre­se­nte­d a gre­at anti­the­si­s be­twe­e­n the­ ri­ght and the­ le­ft for 
cri­te­ri­a on whi­ch a le­ft wi­ng party di­ffe­rs from a ri­ght wi­ng party i­s not 
comple­te­ly congru­e­nt wi­th a basi­s of a di­ffe­re­nce­ be­twe­e­n e­xtre­mi­st and 
mode­rate­ wi­ng. In poli­ti­cal practi­ce­ fasci­sm and commu­ni­sm e­xclu­de­ 
one­ anothe­r not taki­ng i­nto accou­nt the­i­r common e­ne­my-de­mocracy, 
whi­ch wi­th i­t’s ru­le­s and proce­du­re­s allows the­ compe­ti­ti­on be­twe­e­n 
the­ ri­ght and the­ le­ft and the­i­r tu­rn-taki­ng i­n the­ re­gu­lar e­le­cti­on cycle­s. 
What i­s i­n common and i­mmi­ne­nt to both fasci­sm and commu­ni­sm i­s 
bri­ngi­ng of “characte­ri­sti­cally i­de­ologi­cal marks to the­ poi­nt of e­xtre­me­ 
conse­qu­e­nce­ and thi­s i­s e­xactly what make­s the­m i­rre­conci­lable­ and 
practi­cally i­ncompati­ble­ doctri­ne­s”(Bobi­o,1997:45).
Mu­lti­-i­de­ologi­cal colori­ng of post-commu­ni­st syste­ms
Mode­rn post-commu­ni­st ri­ght and le­ft wi­ng i­n Easte­rn-e­u­ropi­an 
and Yu­goslavi­an re­gi­on are­ i­n the­ proce­ss i­f “comple­te­d” de­mocrati­c 
transi­ti­on and re­lati­ve­ly consoli­date­d poli­ti­cal orde­r. Howe­ve­r, more­ 
and more­ pre­se­nt te­nde­ncy to re­li­e­ve­ poli­ti­cs from i­de­ology, pre­se­nt 
i­de­a of the­ e­nd of hi­story (Fu­ku­yama, 1989) or of the­ e­nd of i­de­ologi­e­s 
(D.Be­l, 1990) i­mpose­ some­ u­navoi­dable­ and ope­n qu­e­sti­ons or di­le­m-
mas. Conne­cte­d to thi­s, Zan Bodri­ar pre­se­nts some­ sort of a di­le­mma or 
a de­bate­ i­ssu­e­ i­n hi­s work “Pe­rfe­ct Cri­me­”. Su­pporti­ng a vi­e­w on pe­o-
ple­’s ske­pti­ci­sm towards poli­ti­cs and pre­se­rve­me­nt of ficti­onal poli­ti­cal 
space­, he­ conclu­de­s that, on “the­ plai­n of radi­cal i­nte­lle­ct, an analysi­s 
on le­ft-ri­ght opposi­ti­on was pu­bli­she­d back i­n 1968. In Bodri­ar’s opi­-
ni­on e­ve­n the­n i­t was known that the­ ri­ght and the­ le­ft are­ non-e­xi­sti­ng, 
bu­t prope­r conse­qu­e­nce­s ne­ve­r came­ from that noti­on. Poli­ti­cs mu­st 
be­, he­ thi­nks, re­programme­d on the­ ne­w fou­ndati­ons whe­re­ no di­ffe­-
re­nce­ be­twe­e­n the­ ri­ght and the­ le­ft e­xi­sts. Accordi­ng to thi­s, qu­e­sti­ons 
follow: i­f the­ transi­ti­on i­s u­nde­rstood as conti­nu­ati­on of the­ le­ft i­de­as, 
doe­s i­t ne­ce­ssari­ly i­nclu­de­ the­ change­ of i­de­ology, that i­s can tri­u­mph of 
ri­ght i­de­ologi­e­s i­n post-commu­ni­sm be­ spoke­n of; If the­ ri­ght wi­nd, i­n 
i­t’s first de­mocrati­c bu­rst ble­w off old one­-party and mono-i­de­ologi­cal 
re­gi­me­s, doe­s that me­an that the­ ri­ght wi­ng achi­e­ve­d hi­stori­cal vi­ctory 
ove­r the­ le­ft one­; can we­ spe­ak abou­t transi­ti­on of the­ ri­ght and the­ le­ft, 
and do the­y sti­ll e­xi­st. Thi­s comparati­ve­ analysi­s i­s di­re­cte­d to e­xplai­n 
and gi­ve­ prospe­cts of i­de­ologi­cal mosai­c of “ne­w de­mocraci­e­s”, that i­s 
of post-commu­ni­st mode­l of i­de­ologi­cal archi­te­ctu­re­. In the­ followi­ng 
paragraphs I wi­ll try to offe­r you­ at le­ast some­ answe­rs to the­ pre­vi­o-
u­sly made­ qu­e­sti­ons, to gi­ve­ pe­rsonal obse­rvati­ons and to u­p to a poi­nt 
pu­t some­ li­ght on bi­nary i­de­ologi­cal syste­m i­n the­ ne­w de­mocracy and 
Se­rbi­a e­spe­ci­ally.
In almost all “ne­w de­mocraci­e­s” a sharp bi­polari­sati­on of the­ 
ri­ght and the­ le­ft e­xi­sts, whi­le­ the­ poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r, wi­thou­t whi­ch the­re­ 
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i­s no stable­ de­mocracy, i­s shi­fte­d to the­ margi­ns of hi­stori­cal sce­ne­. 
Strong pre­si­de­nti­al and se­mi­-pre­si­de­nti­al syste­ms i­n post-commu­ni­st 
cou­ntri­e­s re­pre­se­nt some­ ki­nd of su­bsti­tu­te­ for non-e­xi­sti­ng poli­ti­cal 
ce­nte­r. 
If the­ clai­m that stable­ and e­ffici­e­nt de­mocrati­c cou­ntry i­s base­d 
on poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r, whi­ch e­qu­ally attracts nati­onali­sm and li­be­rali­sm, i­s 
acce­pte­d, i­t can be­ noti­ce­d that i­n post-commu­ni­st syste­ms a late­nt con-
fli­ct be­twe­e­n nati­onal and li­be­ral e­xi­sts. Parti­e­s of li­be­ral prove­ni­e­nce­ 
and othe­rs who carry li­be­ral poli­ti­cal i­de­as i­n post-commu­ni­st cou­ntri­e­s 
are­ e­qu­ali­zi­ng, consci­ou­sly or not, nati­onali­sm and totali­tari­ani­sm and 
vi­ce­ ve­rsa, whi­ch re­su­lts i­n di­vi­si­on of poli­ti­cal space­ on the­ ri­ght and 
the­ le­ft, to the­ de­tri­me­nt of poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r.
Li­be­rali­sm as poli­ti­cal doctri­nai­re­ i­de­ology, move­me­nt and prac-
ti­ce­ achi­e­ve­d a hi­stori­cal vi­ctory worldwi­de­ be­cau­se­ i­n i­t’s te­achi­ngs 
i­t anti­ci­pate­d “the­ e­nd of hi­story of all u­topi­as and the­ be­gi­nni­ng of hi­-
story wi­thou­t normati­ve­ i­de­as”. Havi­ng noti­ce­d that be­hi­nd the­ di­vi­si­on 
on the­ le­ft and the­ ri­ght the­ stru­ggle­ be­twe­e­n two u­topi­as wi­th di­ffe­re­nt 
i­de­ologi­cal connotati­ons i­s hi­dde­n, post commu­ni­st i­nte­lle­ctu­al e­li­te­ 
consi­ste­ntly abstai­ns from acti­ve­ poli­ti­cal parti­ci­pati­on. The­ re­ason and 
the­ moti­f of su­ch passi­ve­ be­havi­or shou­ld be­ se­arche­d for i­n the­ fact 
that cohe­re­nt and strong poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r whi­ch wou­ld be­ re­lati­ve­ly ac-
ce­ptable­ poli­ti­cal opti­on wi­th i­t’s balance­ be­twe­e­n nati­onal and li­be­ral 
doe­s not e­xi­st. In the­ e­xtre­me­ case­, the­ le­ft or the­ ri­ght ce­nte­r i­s acce­p-
table­ bu­t ne­ve­r classi­cal ri­ght or le­ft. The­re­for, one­ of the­ i­mportant pre­-
condi­ti­ons for re­su­mi­ng stable­ and i­n re­al se­nse­ li­be­ral de­mocracy, i­n 
othe­r words plu­rali­sti­c orde­r i­n post-commu­ni­st cou­ntri­e­s i­s achi­e­vi­ng 
conse­nsu­s of li­be­ral poli­ti­cal powe­rs on the­ i­ssu­e­ that nati­onal i­nte­re­st 
i­nclu­de­s soci­al progre­ss i­n ge­ne­ral, prospe­ri­ty of e­conomy, au­tonomy 
of poli­ti­cal de­ci­si­ons and cu­ltu­rally-tradi­ti­onal ori­gi­nali­ty. Only afte­r 
fu­lfillme­nt of the­se­ condi­ti­ons wi­ll e­ve­ry dange­r of e­ve­ntu­al post-com-
mu­ni­st totali­tari­ani­sm appe­ari­ng be­ e­li­mi­nate­d, i­nclu­di­ng the­ dange­r i­n 
the­ form of su­pe­r-pre­si­de­nti­al and se­mi­-pre­si­de­nti­al syste­ms of gove­rn-
me­nt. Ce­rtai­nly, the­ path towards ove­rcomi­ng the­se­ au­thori­tari­an and 
non-de­mocrati­c te­nde­nci­e­s and occu­rre­nce­s, volen­s n­olen­s, starts at the­ 
stable­ poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r.
The­ i­nflu­e­nce­ of e­le­ctoral syste­m on the­ proce­ss of 
formi­ng i­de­ologi­cal profile­s of poli­ti­cal parti­e­s
De­bate­s that are­ he­ld today abou­t advantage­s and di­sadvantage­s 
of by majori­ty controlle­d, that i­s proporti­onal e­le­ctoral syste­m and the­-
i­r i­nflu­e­nce­ on party re­li­e­f and i­de­ologi­cal mosai­c are­ cu­rre­nt as we­ll 
as ope­n to ne­w pros and cons argu­me­nts. Comparati­ve­ly hi­stori­c and 
analyti­cal e­xami­nati­ons of e­le­cti­ons and e­le­ctoral syste­ms can be­, qu­-
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i­te­ si­mpli­fyi­ngly, re­du­ce­d to a maxi­m that “whi­le­ proporti­onal e­le­cto-
ral syste­ms produ­ce­ paralysi­s, majori­ty controlle­d syste­m produ­ce­s 
catalysi­s.” Actu­ally, majori­ty controlle­d e­le­ctoral syste­m favors large­ 
poli­ti­cal blocks and party coali­ti­ons and e­ncou­rage­s cre­ati­on of a bi­po-
lar party sce­ne­, that i­s, produ­ce­s two-party syste­m or the­ syste­m wi­th 
two i­de­ologi­e­s. Majori­ty controlle­d syste­m le­ads not only to e­stabli­s-
hi­ng more­ stable­ and produ­cti­ve­ party syste­m, bu­t also to fu­ncti­oni­ng 
of i­de­ologi­cally more­ fle­xi­ble­, de­mocrati­c and transpare­nt parti­e­s. On 
the­ othe­r hand, proporti­onal e­le­ctoral syste­m e­ncou­rage­s not only frag-
me­ntati­on of the­ party syste­m and de­volu­ti­on of large­r parti­e­s, bu­t al-
so a gre­ate­r i­de­ologi­sm, “mysti­ci­sm” and bu­re­au­cracy i­n party syste­m. 
Majori­ty controlle­d de­mocracy me­an a re­lati­ve­ly stable­ and e­ffici­e­nt 
gove­rnme­nt whose­ te­rm de­pe­nds on the­ le­ngth of re­pre­se­ntati­ve­s’ te­rm. 
On the­ othe­r hand, majori­ty controlle­d e­le­ctoral syste­m provi­de­s wi­th 
pre­tty e­asi­e­r formi­ng, aggre­gati­on and arti­cu­lati­on of poli­ti­cal strate­gi­-
e­s and i­de­ologi­cal landmark, i­n othe­r words i­t si­gni­ficantly i­nflu­e­nce­s 
party-i­de­ologi­cal bi­polari­zati­on. Bi­fu­rcati­on of i­de­as of party landscape­ 
i­s maki­ng e­asi­e­r for the­ vote­rs to choose­ be­twe­e­n one­ and the­ othe­r po-
li­ti­cal strate­gy, that i­s one­ or the­ othe­r party-forme­d poli­ti­cs. Majori­ty 
controlle­d syste­m i­n two e­le­ctoral rou­nds i­s an e­ffici­e­nt way to di­sti­ll 
party sce­ne­. In France­, for e­xample­, thanks to su­ch a syste­m Le­Pe­n’s 
Nati­onalFront i­s tradi­ti­onally i­nsi­gni­ficant powe­r i­n parli­ame­nt. In Italy 
pre­se­rvi­ng a proporti­onal qu­ota e­nable­s ne­ore­forme­d commu­ni­sts to 
mai­ntai­n i­n the­ role­ of “the­ thi­rd di­sru­pti­ve­ party”.
Coe­xi­ste­nce­ of a proporti­onal e­le­ctoral syste­m and se­mi­-pre­si­-
de­nti­ali­sm, as i­t i­s the­ case­ i­n Se­rbi­a, produ­ce­s contradi­ctory i­nflu­e­n-
ce­ on “poli­ti­cal e­nvi­ronme­nt” and consti­tu­ti­onal orde­r i­n ge­ne­ral. Se­-
mi­-pre­si­de­nti­al syste­m e­ncou­rage­s grou­pi­ng of parti­e­s i­nto coali­ti­ons 
or two parti­e­s whi­ch stre­ngthe­ns the­ te­nde­ncy for two party syste­m, 
whi­le­ proporti­onal e­le­ctoral syste­m se­cu­re­s e­xi­ste­nce­ of more­ than two 
parti­e­s. Effici­e­ncy of the­se­ two i­nsti­tu­ti­ons-se­mi­-pre­si­de­nti­ali­sm and 
proporti­onal syste­m- whi­ch i­s noti­ce­d i­n achi­e­vi­ng a basi­c conse­nsu­s 
i­s also contradi­ctory: pre­si­de­nti­ali­sm i­mmane­ntly e­ncou­rage­s e­xtre­me­ 
polari­zati­on for i­t cre­ate­s absolu­te­ lose­rs and absolu­te­ wi­nne­rs on pre­-
si­de­nti­al e­le­cti­ons, whi­le­ proporti­onal syste­m se­cu­re­s assu­mpti­ons for 
compromi­se­ be­twe­e­n all re­le­vant poli­ti­cal force­s.
Proporti­onal e­le­ctoral syste­m gi­ve­s the­ tru­e­st pi­ctu­re­ of e­xpre­s-
se­d vote­rs wi­ll by di­stri­bu­ti­on of re­pre­se­ntati­ve­s’ mandate­s i­n propor-
ti­on wi­th the­ nu­mbe­r of vote­s that are­ won. By produ­ci­ng a fragme­n-
te­d party and parli­ame­ntary syste­m, proporti­on as me­thod re­produ­ce­s 
an e­xtre­me­ly party he­te­roge­ne­ou­s and u­nstable­ coali­ti­on gove­rnme­nt 
whose­ te­rm, that i­s su­rvi­val i­s de­ci­de­d u­pon on the­ le­ve­l of e­phe­me­ral 
poli­ti­cal ne­goti­ati­ons i­n whi­ch most ofte­n small re­pre­se­ntati­ve­s’ grou­ps 
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and “cou­ch”parti­e­s have­ the­ le­adi­ng role­. In Eu­rope­an le­ft wi­ng propor-
ti­onal e­le­ctoral syste­m was always ju­dge­d as synonym for re­gu­lari­ty 
and de­mocracy, su­ppose­dly be­cau­se­ i­t gave­ the­ re­al pi­ctu­re­ of the­ vote­rs 
e­xpre­sse­d wi­ll i­n parli­ame­nt. At the­ be­gi­nni­ng of thi­s ce­ntu­ry the­ le­ft 
e­spe­ci­ally favore­d proporti­onal e­le­ctoral syste­m for i­t e­nable­d the­ le­ft, 
whi­ch was a growi­ng poli­ti­cal powe­r, to e­nte­r parli­ame­nt and wi­n re­pre­-
se­ntati­ve­s’ mandate­s. Fi­ghti­ng agai­nst majori­ty controlle­d syste­m from 
the­ start, the­ le­ft consi­de­re­d that syste­m to be­ basi­cally re­acti­onary and 
e­li­ti­st be­cau­se­ i­t di­sable­d the­ party that re­pre­se­nte­d a cohe­re­nt program 
and poli­ti­cs to be­ chose­n. In that syste­m i­ndi­vi­du­als are­ chose­n to re­pre­-
se­nt local i­nte­re­sts of the­i­r e­le­ctoral u­ni­t, and not i­nte­re­sts of the­ whole­ 
soci­e­ty. Ti­me­ and practi­ce­, howe­ve­r, prove­d some­thi­ng e­lse­. Gabri­e­l 
Armond thi­nks that majori­ty syste­m can not e­xi­st i­n e­ve­ry soci­e­ty be­ca-
u­se­ that syste­m i­s an e­xpre­ssi­on and proof of we­ll-de­ve­lope­d soci­e­ty. 
Contrary to an assu­mpti­on that majori­ty syste­m cre­ate­s bi­polar soci­e­ty, 
what actu­ally happe­ns i­s that alre­ady bi­polari­ze­d soci­e­ty cre­ate­s majo-
ri­ty syste­m. Di­vi­si­ons on the­ ri­ght and the­ le­ft, whi­ch e­xi­ste­d, we­re­ not 
forme­d by e­le­ctoral syste­m (Almond,1974:145).
The­ le­ft and the­ ri­ght i­n Se­rbi­a
Pre­vi­ou­sly me­nti­one­d the­ore­ti­cal obse­rvati­ons e­nable­ a re­lati­-
ve­ly vali­d e­mpi­ri­cal analysi­s of i­de­ologi­cal poli­ti­cal parti­e­s’ platform i­n 
Se­rbi­a to be­ pe­rforme­d. Re­le­vant parti­e­s whi­ch are­ domi­nati­ng and acti­-
ve­ly parti­ci­pate­ i­n Se­rbi­a poli­ti­cal sce­ne­ can not be­ cle­arly i­de­ologi­cally 
i­de­nti­fie­d nor classi­fie­d as parti­e­s of the­ ri­ght or parti­e­s of the­ le­ft. Insu­f-
fici­e­nt i­de­ologi­cal profile­ of the­ parti­e­s i­s du­e­ to a none­xi­ste­nt ye­t ne­ce­s-
sary corre­sponde­nce­ be­twe­e­n party and soci­al stru­ctu­re­, i­n othe­r word 
i­nsu­ffici­e­nt se­di­me­ntati­on of the­ parti­e­s’ landscape­ i­n soci­al and class 
basi­s of soci­e­ty. I wi­ll talk more­ abou­t that late­r. Poli­ti­cal parti­e­s i­n the­i­r 
programs and practi­cal acti­vi­ti­e­s contai­n e­le­me­nts of both le­ft and ri­ght 
poli­ti­cal opti­on so that i­de­ologi­cal hybri­d at gre­at e­xte­nt compli­cate­s 
party sce­ne­ i­nte­rnally and e­xte­rnally. Taki­ng i­nto an accou­nt that party 
topography i­n Se­rbi­a sti­ll doe­s not have­ de­mocrati­c stru­ctu­re­ and i­s not 
soci­ally e­stabli­she­d i­n soci­al and poli­ti­cal syste­m, hardly any stri­ct clas-
si­ficati­on of parti­e­s can be­ produ­ce­d, i­n the­ se­nse­ that one­ party re­pre­-
se­nts one­ and anothe­r party anothe­r i­de­ologi­cal ori­e­ntati­on or poli­ti­cal 
strate­gy. In one­ si­ngle­ party both le­ft and ri­ght i­de­as can be­ fou­nd, and 
i­t’s not a rare­ thi­ng to se­e­ ri­ght wi­ng and le­ft fracti­on acti­ng toge­the­r. 
The­ de­gre­e­ of achi­e­ve­d conve­rge­nce­ and coe­xi­ste­nce­ of two cu­rre­nts or 
i­de­ologi­cal fracti­ons i­s de­te­rme­nt by a de­gre­e­ of party’s i­nte­rnal stabi­-
li­ty and cohe­si­on. For classi­ficati­on of parti­e­s along the­ le­ft-ri­ght li­ne­ 
we­ ne­e­d to focu­s on ce­rtai­n pe­rmane­nt poi­nts or di­le­mmas su­ch as, for 
e­xample­, soci­al i­ssu­e­s, qu­e­sti­on of the­ form of gove­rnme­nt- re­pu­bli­c or 
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monarchy, nati­onal i­ssu­e­, the­ qu­e­sti­on of state­ or pri­vate­ prope­rty, or 
parti­e­s’ re­lati­on towards UN.
Inne­r-party bi­fu­rcati­on of i­nte­re­sts and choi­ce­s, that i­s coe­xi­-
ste­nce­ of both ri­ght and le­ft e­le­me­nts has si­gni­ficant i­nflu­e­nce­ on the­ 
conte­nts of the­ party program, poli­ti­cal platform and parti­e­s’ acti­vi­ty. 
Wi­de­-range­ i­nsu­ffici­e­ncy of de­mocrati­c pote­nti­al i­n a soci­e­ty and poli­-
ti­cal orde­r, i­de­ologi­cal du­ali­sm, i­n a way e­ve­n e­cle­cti­ci­sm produ­ce­ i­n 
a gre­at de­gre­e­ chari­smati­cally cli­e­nti­sti­c and i­ndi­vi­du­ally au­thori­tari­an 
parti­e­s. The­ re­produ­cti­on of spe­ci­al “ce­zaropopi­sti­c” parti­e­s i­n ou­r poli­-
ti­cal e­nvi­ronme­nt i­s backe­d u­p by a su­bje­ct to au­thori­ty type­ of poli­ti­cal 
cu­ltu­re­ and Se­rbi­an me­ntali­ty of the­ i­nfe­ri­or. The­ e­xi­sti­ng i­de­ologi­cal 
confu­si­on su­i­ts the­ poli­ti­cal cli­mate­ i­n whole­ and party le­ade­rs who 
are­ compi­li­ng di­ffe­re­nt i­de­as and poli­ti­cal opti­ons ski­llfu­lly mani­pu­la-
ti­ng wi­th party me­mbe­rs as we­ll as wi­th vote­rs. Howe­ve­r, to ste­e­r the­ 
party across the­ stormy se­e­s of poli­ti­cs carri­e­s i­n i­tse­lf the­ late­nt dange­r 
of cre­ati­ng the­ swampy “du­nge­on” cave­s at tou­chi­ng the­ su­rface­. The­ 
“du­nge­on” cave­s can stand the­ party’s “cargo”, ye­t i­t i­s not rare­ to se­e­ 
how i­nvi­si­ble­ rocks u­nde­r the­ su­rface­ take­ the­ party wi­th i­t’s i­de­ologi­cal 
lu­ggage­ down to the­ mu­ddy poli­ti­cal bottom.
Obse­rvi­ng the­ pre­se­nt Se­rbi­an poli­ti­cal sce­ne­ i­t i­s possi­ble­ to i­de­n-
ti­fy fe­w poli­ti­cal opti­ons i­n the­ ri­ght i­de­ologi­cal wi­ng: ne­oli­be­rali­sm or 
the­ mode­rate­ ri­ght, the­ e­xtre­me­ ri­ght or the­ ri­ght radi­cali­sm and the­ 
tradi­ti­onally conse­rvati­ve­ ri­ght, whe­re­as the­ le­ft i­de­ologi­cal spe­ctru­m 
i­nclu­de­s the­ mode­rate­ le­ft and the­ e­xtre­me­ le­ft of the­ “ne­wcompose­d” 
bu­si­ne­ss. Accordi­ng to the­ clai­ms of the­ me­mbe­rs of the­ local le­ft wi­ng, 
that ve­ry le­ft wi­ng at the­ e­le­cti­ons shou­ld be­ compose­d from those­ who 
carry “patri­oti­c, de­mocrati­c and progre­ssi­ve­ vi­e­ws”. From thi­s state­ an 
i­de­ologi­cal syncre­ti­sm, i­nconsi­ste­ncy and e­ve­n confu­si­on of i­de­as i­n 
the­ le­ft poli­ti­cal pole­ can cle­arly be­ noti­ce­d. The­ analysi­s of u­p to now 
gathe­re­d e­le­cti­on re­su­lts of the­ parti­e­s gravi­tati­ng towards the­ mi­ddle­, 
be­twe­e­n the­ le­ft and the­ ri­ght i­de­ologi­cal and program opti­on, show that 
the­ ce­nte­r parti­e­s won 10% of vote­rs. The­ stru­ggle­ for poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r 
and wi­nni­ng or taki­ng the­ large­r se­at the­ be­tte­r i­s ye­t to come­. 
In the­ ci­vi­li­an pove­rty si­tu­ati­on of wi­de­ range­ whe­n a gre­at nu­m-
be­r of ci­ti­ze­ns de­pe­nd on the­ state­, e­ve­ry ne­oli­be­ral ri­ght program se­nds 
cle­ar me­ssage­ to the­ pe­nsi­one­rs, the­ u­ne­mploye­d and othe­r soci­ally trou­-
ble­d cate­gori­e­s what the­y may e­xpe­ct i­n the­ case­ the­ ri­ght wi­ns the­ e­le­c-
ti­ons. The­ u­lti­mate­ modali­ti­e­s of the­ le­ft-e­gali­ty and of the­ ri­ght-li­be­ra-
li­sm su­ffe­re­d a re­lati­ve­ fai­lu­re­ on ou­r poli­ti­cal sce­ne­. If poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r 
i­s stre­ngthe­ni­ng the­ pole­s are­ ge­tti­ng we­ake­r whi­ch doe­s not ne­ce­ssari­ly 
me­an that i­n ne­ar fu­tu­re­ an i­de­ologi­cal pe­ndu­lu­m can not agai­n “swi­ng” 
a li­ttle­ bi­t too mu­ch to the­ le­ft or to the­ ri­ght. 
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Parti­e­s that ti­ll ye­ste­rday we­re­ promi­si­ng qu­i­ck change­s, today 
are­ gi­vi­ng u­p on that radi­cal and proclai­me­d e­nte­rpri­se­s whi­ch i­s a su­re­ 
si­gn of vote­rs tu­rni­ng towards the­ parti­e­s of soci­alde­mocrati­c ori­e­nta-
ti­on. In re­ce­nt pe­ri­od i­n the­ state­me­nts of e­xtre­me­ly nati­onal, maybe­ 
e­ve­n nati­onali­st party le­ade­rs, one­ can he­ar that those­ parti­e­s are­ par-
ti­e­s of the­ mode­rate­ ri­ght and the­ ri­ght ce­nte­r. A conte­mporary party 
landscape­ more­ and more­ shows the­ characte­ri­sti­cs of and te­nde­nci­e­s 
to di­chotomou­s composi­ti­on of poli­ti­cal u­ni­ve­rse­. The­ e­xi­ste­nce­ and 
acti­vi­ty of two large­, more­ or le­ss, u­ni­te­d block coali­ti­on or alli­ance­ i­s 
an e­xpre­ssi­on of not only a ne­e­d for i­de­ologi­cal u­ni­ty bu­t also a conse­-
qu­e­nce­ of re­lati­ve­ly aggre­gate­d ye­t not cle­arly e­nou­gh arti­cu­late­d soci­al 
stru­ctu­re­ of i­nte­re­st. A ce­rtai­n de­ballans of a party archi­te­ctu­re­ to co-
me­ i­s possi­ble­ and de­si­rable­, whi­ch i­s i­ndi­cate­d by ce­rtai­n si­gnals and 
i­mpu­lse­s, locate­d be­twe­e­n the­ le­ft and the­ ri­ght block. Poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r 
block (barre­) wou­ld i­ncorporate­ i­n i­tse­lf the­ ce­nte­r of ce­nte­r parti­e­s as 
we­ll as the­ parti­e­s of the­ le­ft or the­ ri­ght ce­nte­r. In su­ch a way a tri­ad 
party-block sce­ne­ wou­ld gai­n dynami­cs, attracti­ve­ne­ss and u­nce­rtai­nty, 
bu­t on the­ othe­r hand i­t wou­ld su­re­ly attri­bu­te­ to a re­du­cti­on of pre­se­nt 
e­xtre­me­ polari­zati­on whi­ch pre­se­nts a constant thre­at of pote­nti­al con-
fli­ct. Afte­r all, vote­rs’ mood, i­nflu­e­nce­d by whole­-scale­ soci­al cri­si­s and 
more­ and more­ bi­gge­r soci­al di­ffe­re­nce­s, as we­ll as i­nsu­ffici­e­ntly mo-
de­le­d i­de­as on the­ party sce­ne­, i­ndi­cate­s that i­n ti­me­ to come­ poli­ti­cal 
pe­ndu­lu­m wi­ll more­ and more­ osci­llate­ from the­ ri­ght to the­ le­ft ce­nte­r 
and vi­ce­ ve­rsa, bu­t not from the­ ri­ght to the­ le­ft wi­ng, that i­s from one­ 
to anothe­r e­xtre­me­ pole­. Soci­al and e­conomi­c swi­ngs i­n soci­e­ty and i­n-
consi­ste­ncy of the­ mai­n characte­rs on poli­ti­cal sce­ne­ le­ad to a cre­ati­on 
of poli­ti­cal amalgam whi­ch wou­ld i­nclu­de­ the­ mode­rate­ le­ft and the­ 
mode­rate­ ri­ght, bu­t at the­ same­ ti­me­ te­nd to maki­ng a ce­rtai­n ballans of 
small ampli­tu­de­s i­nsi­de­ the­ poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r.
If we­ take­ u­nde­r consi­de­rati­on a broade­r hori­zon of i­de­as or po-
li­ti­cal phi­losophy, almost all-poli­ti­cal parti­e­s su­ffe­r from chroni­cle­ i­n-
su­ffici­e­ncy of ge­tti­ng i­nto a profile­ i­n the­ fie­ld of i­de­as. Opi­ni­on abou­t 
bi­polar poli­ti­cal sce­ne­ i­n Se­rbi­a i­s base­d on assu­mpti­on that the­ mode­-
rate­ le­ft e­xi­sts ne­xt to the­ ri­ght ce­nte­r. On the­ othe­r hand, i­n the­ ti­me­ of 
post-plu­rali­sti­c shock whe­n the­ dynami­c, rati­onal and mode­rn poli­ti­cal 
strate­gi­e­s of de­ve­lopme­nt shou­ld have­ be­e­n e­xpe­cte­d, many of opposi­ti­-
onal parti­e­s are­ of too mu­ch tradi­ti­onal and monarchy-nati­onali­sti­c ori­-
e­ntati­on. In the­ ti­me­ of mass i­mpove­rme­nt and more­ and more­ gre­ate­r 
soci­al chasm, a large­ porti­on of opposi­ti­onal parti­e­s se­e­m to sti­ll be­ the­ 
proclai­me­r of i­de­ali­ze­d ne­oli­be­rali­st vari­ant, i­n othe­r words ne­oconse­r-
vati­sm, whi­ch doe­s not e­xi­st i­n su­ch a form and i­s not e­ve­n fu­ncti­oni­ng 
i­n the­ cou­ntri­e­s wi­th parli­ame­ntary de­mocracy.
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In accordance­ wi­th more­ and more­ pre­se­nt soci­ally e­conomi­c 
and poli­ti­cal bi­polari­sati­on of soci­e­ty, whi­ch be­come­s more­ and mo-
re­ ane­mi­c and pote­nti­ally qu­i­te­ i­mplosi­ve­, some­ anachroni­st and poli­-
ti­cally re­trograde­ i­de­as and te­nde­nci­e­s are­ appe­ari­ng. The­y carry the­ 
mark of e­ve­r-lasti­ng poli­ti­cal apo-kastasi­s and me­ani­ngle­ss worshi­pi­ng 
of an i­ndi­vi­du­al. Fi­nally, i­t can be­ conclu­de­d that we­ are­ wi­tne­ssi­ng a 
proce­ss of pse­u­do-plu­rali­zati­on or qu­asi­-plu­rali­sti­c soci­al de­mocrati­za-
ti­on whi­ch le­ads to ove­r-e­xpre­sse­d de­magogi­c or mani­pu­lati­ve­ i­de­olo-
gi­zati­on of poli­ti­cal li­fe­. In othe­r words, ficti­onal i­de­as abou­t the­ le­ft, 
the­ ri­ght or the­ ce­nte­r are­ be­comi­ng crystal cle­ar i­f the­ re­al natu­re­ of 
poli­ti­cal syste­m i­s pe­rce­i­ve­d, that i­s i­f the­ e­sse­nce­ i­s re­ali­ze­d as we­ll as 
the­ way the­ poli­ti­cal i­nsti­tu­ti­ons and the­ cou­ntry fu­ncti­ons i­n ge­ne­ral.
The­ non-e­xi­ste­nce­ of i­de­ologi­cal profile­ and party syste­m’s se­di­-
me­nt re­su­lts i­n i­nsu­ffici­e­ntly re­spe­ctable­ and far from i­nflu­e­nti­al parli­-
ame­nt, whi­ch u­navoi­dably le­ads to the­ stre­ngthe­ni­ng of e­xe­cu­ti­ve­ vi­s-
à-vi­s le­gi­slati­on and transformi­ng parli­ame­ntary or se­mi­-parli­ame­ntary 
syste­ms i­nto pre­si­de­nti­al or su­pe­r-pre­si­de­nti­al syste­ms. The­ e­sse­nti­al 
i­ssu­e­, whi­ch almost all post-commu­ni­st cou­ntri­e­s are­ faci­ng, i­s how to 
de­si­gn hori­zontal plai­n’s opti­mal mode­l of powe­r organi­zati­on and of re­-
ali­sti­cally acce­ptable­ party configu­rati­on. Di­le­mmas that the­ post-com-
mu­ni­st cou­ntri­e­s now de­al wi­th are­: we­the­r to opt be­twe­e­n two or tre­e­ 
or mu­lti­-party syste­ms and whi­ch form of gove­rnme­nt organi­zati­on to 
choose­. In othe­r words whi­ch i­nsti­tu­ti­onal arrange­me­nt to acce­pt-classi­-
cal parli­ame­ntary or se­mi­-pre­si­de­nti­al or pre­si­de­nti­al arrange­me­nt. The­ 
ti­me­, that prove­d more­ than once­ to be­ the­ be­st ju­dge­ and i­nte­rpre­te­r of 
hi­story, wi­ll provi­de­ wi­th answe­rs to the­se­ di­le­mmas.
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Su­mmary
The­ most of “ne­w de­mocracy” (postcommu­ni­st cou­ntri­e­s) i­s cha-
racte­ri­ze­d by i­nsu­ffici­e­ntly di­ve­rsi­fie­d and i­de­ologi­cally non-e­stabli­s-
he­d party syste­m. The­ pre­se­nce­ of di­ffe­re­nt i­de­ologi­cal ori­e­ntati­ons, of-
te­n arti­fici­al and contradi­ctory ye­t sci­e­nti­fically party amalgams, poi­nts 
ou­t soci­al non-di­ffe­re­nti­ati­on of post-commu­ni­st soci­e­ti­e­s and flu­i­di­ty, 
whi­ch i­s actu­ally i­nconsi­ste­ncy of party’s vote­rs. Post-commu­ni­st i­de­o-
logi­cal spe­ctru­m i­nclu­de­s a gre­at nu­mbe­r of vari­ants or mode­ls of both 
the­ le­ft and the­ ri­ght opti­on. Ce­rtai­n i­de­ologi­cal confu­si­on, large­ly sti­-
mu­late­d by party e­li­te­ or oli­garchi­e­s the­mse­lve­s, i­s produ­ci­ng u­nstable­ 
and di­sfu­ncti­onal poli­ti­cal syste­m, and thi­s i­s maki­ng condi­ti­ons for the­ 
late­nt ye­t di­stu­rbi­ng cri­si­s of the­ cou­ntry and i­t’s orde­r. The­ stre­ngthe­-
ni­ng of poli­ti­cal ce­nte­r i­s we­ake­ni­ng the­ e­xtre­me­ le­ft and the­ e­xtre­me­ 
ri­ght, i­n othe­r words i­t de­-radi­cali­ze­s poli­ti­cs and vote­rs. On the­ othe­r 
hand, cre­ati­on of a ce­ntri­st alli­ance­ le­ads to re­lati­ve­ stabi­li­ty and gre­ate­r 
de­mocracy of the­ syste­m, that i­s i­t le­ads to acce­ptance­ of the­ basi­c postu­-
late­ for mi­ni­mal or proce­du­re­ de­mocracy.
Зоран Крстић 
Факултет политичких наука, Београд
Резиме
За већину „новодемократских“ (посткомунистичких) држа-
ва карактеристичан је политички систем који није успостављен 
нити довољно разграничен по идеолошким основама. Различите 
идеолошке оријентације, често мешавина уметних и контрадиктор-
них, а ипак научно дефинисаних партијских коалиција, указују на 
друштвену неиздиференцираност и несталност у тим пост-комуни-
стичким државама, што се у стварности одражава у недоследности 
у гласању за политичке партије. Посткомунистички идеолошки 
спектрум садржи велики број варијанти или модела и леве и десне 
опције. Извесна идеолошка конфузија, коју углавном условљавају 
сама партијска елита и олигарси, производи нестабилан и дисфунк-
ционалан политички систем, и то ствара услове за латентну и узне-
миравајућу кризу државе и њеног поретка. Јачање политичког цен-
тра слаби екстремну левицу и екстремну десницу, другим речима 
оно дерадикализује политику и гласаче. С друге стране, стварање 
централистичке коалиције води ка релативној стабилности и већој 
демократичности система, односно води ка прихваћању основних 
постулата минималне или процедуралне демократије.
